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ABSTRACT
Since the end of the Cold War, our world has seen an increase in intra-state conflict and
the emergence of the notion of state accountability for the treatment of their citizens.
Furthermore, sovereign states increasingly see that it is in their interest to apply the rule
of law and human rights norms beyond their borders. While peace building efforts have
been achieved through criminal prosecutions, truth commissions, reparation programs,
and vetting, a truth commission, in particular, has been progressively used in the past
decade as one aspect of transitional justice measures. This increase in use illustrates its
popularity in handling sensitive and fragile post-conflict societies. However, unless a
state fulfills its obligations to protect the rights of its citizens by implementing
recommendations by a truth commission, there is little room for creating a just and
peaceful society.

Therefore, how the international community deals with volatile

post-conflict situations, i.e., the issue of accountability for human rights abuse and
reconciliation, has wider implications for global stability.
Drawing experiences chronologically from the past three different commissions in El
Salvador, South Africa, and Sierra Leone, I will analyze tensions between justice and
truth and to what extent truth commissions are effective in promoting reconciliation and
achieving a durable peace.

Then, taking an example of the recently established

commission in Sri Lanka as a case study, I will examine what kind of lessons Sri Lanka
can (or cannot) draw from truth and reconciliation processes used in similar cases.
For my hypothesis, I will argue that without international pressure or changes within
the leadership, institutional reforms or prosecution will not take place.
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This is especially

true with intra-state armed conflicts because international action on protecting human
rights may be essential.
For the time being, there have been no prosecutions in Sri Lanka to address past
abuses, nor institutional reforms to protect people from human rights violation in the
future, thus, my hypothesis is correct.

For these reasons, Sri Lanka poses a new

challenge to countrywide reconciliation and the concept of transitional justice
mechanisms, i.e., truth commissions and prosecution.

To conclude, this thesis calls for

further research to respond to a new challenge that truth commissions are facing in
dealing with post-conflict countries.

3

Chapter One
Introduction
Topic: The focus of this study is an examination of truth commissions following
high-level conflict.

I will examine both justice and truth as preconditions for

reconciliation in a country emerging from political violence or armed conflict. The
thesis analyzes to what extent truth commissions are effective in facilitating reconciliation
on the national level and achieving a durable peace, using El Salvador, South Africa,
Sierra Leone, and Sri Lanka as case studies.

Justification/rationale: Since the end of WWII, national and transnational social
movements on human rights have induced states to incorporate norms of universal human
rights into their domestic policy.

Over the past two decades since the end of the Cold

War, our world has seen an increase in power distribution and the notion of state
accountability for the treatment of their citizens has emerged.

Sovereign states

increasingly see that it is in their interest to apply the rule of law beyond their borders.
That said, the post-Cold War world is increasingly being tested on how to solve
intra-state conflict, while the gap between the protection and promotion of human rights
in principle and in practice seems widening. Moreover, human rights issues tend to be
more politicized than ever, polarizing the world not only between the Global North and
the Global South, but also within the United Nations and the U.N. Security Council.
The end of prolonged armed conflict by military means in Sri Lanka poses a great
challenge to the international community.

This thesis focuses on how they deal with the
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justification of the use of military action to defeat what Sri Lanka terms terrorism.
Accountability and the promotion of reconciliation through transitional justice
mechanisms will also be examined. Unless a state fulfills its obligations to protect the
rights of its citizens by implementing recommendations by a truth commission, there is
little room for creating a just and peaceful society. Therefore, how the international
community deals with volatile post-conflict situations, i.e., the issue of accountability for
human rights abuse and reconciliation, has wider implications for global stability.

This

poses a major challenge to contemporary policy debates on international relations.

Hypothesis: This thesis will argue that without international pressure or changes within
the leadership, institutional reforms or prosecution will not take place. This is especially
true with intra-state armed conflicts because international action on protecting human
rights may be essential.

Theory: I will argue that evidence from case studies confirms the applicability of
normative theory which proposes that the international community of states assesses and
evaluates acceptable standards for behavior in the international system. These standards
are set out particularly through international law.

Similarly, constructivism explains that

the force of ideas, beliefs, and standards of appropriate behavior will influence state
behavior and compliance with international law.

The importance of norms and

obligations of states for human rights violations is increasingly recognized in dealing with
the post-Cold War intra-state conflicts. Peace building efforts have been progressively
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achieved through transitional justice measures including criminal prosecutions, truth
commissions, reparation programs, and vetting. Especially, a truth commission has been
increasingly used as one aspect of transitional justice measures. This increase in use
illustrates its popularity in handling sensitive and fragile post-conflict societies.
The ongoing process in post-conflict Sri Lanka, however, seems to pose a new
challenge to the progress of achieving human rights norms. The current situation in Sri
Lanka may demonstrate that forward progress on norm formation on human rights is not
linear, but could become stifled or even degenerate. Post-conflict exclusionary policies
by the Sri Lankan government do not seem to redress the deep ethnic and political divide
that was created during the protracted conflict. This exclusion continues to hamper the
restoration of civil society with a common agenda which cuts across ethnic and political
lines.
The case of Sri Lanka may also underscore the argument that “the threat of
prosecution could cause powerful dictators or insurgents to entrench themselves in
power.”1

In other words, confronted with accusations of crimes against humanity and

war crimes, the leadership in Sri Lanka seems to be barricading itself against outside
intervention while downplaying the norms upholding respect for human rights.

After all,

the effectiveness of the normative system depends on states as responsibility bearers to
comply with norms and on how well the international community can address its
normative concerns.

1

Kathryn Sikkink, The Justice Cascade, (New York: Norton, 2011), 179.
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Research Design
Methodology: By employing qualitative methods and a case study approach, this thesis
will attempt to test my hypothesis by examining three past commissions and the most
recent commission created in Sri Lanka.

The case is unique in that the conflict was one

of the longest cases addressed by a truth and reconciliation commission (TRC), the
longest being the apartheid regime in South Africa, lasting from 1949 to 1994. It is
commonly understood that the year 1983 saw the inception of the violent ethnic conflict
in Sri Lanka, that later escalated into the protracted civil war until 2009. Furthermore,
underlying causes of the conflict are complex, involving domestic (ethno-religious and
political-economic divides), regional (the Indian intervention), and international (the
Tamil diaspora and the Norwegian-brokered peace talks) dimensions.
What is more, the unique character of this case is untested because no past resolved
case perfectly fits the nature of the conflict in Sri Lanka.

For instance, in some Latin

American countries, violence and human rights abuse took place under military rule,
which is not the case in Sri Lanka.

The example of the complexity of war, ethnic and

group identity and colonialism in Africa2 might come into play in a similar manner as the
Sri Lankan conflict. Yet, most conflicts were resolved through a peace agreement or
sponsored by the U.N. or international non-governmental organizations (INGOs),
whereas the conflict in Sri Lanka ended with a military victory in the name of defeating
terrorism.
Taking account of many other factors, I will compare several cases, where truth
2

Priscilla Hayner, “Fifteen Truth Commissions – 1974 to 1994: A Comparative Study,” Human Rights
Quarterly, 16, no.4 (Nov.1994): 654.
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commissions, prosecution, and other reconciliation measures contributed to resolving
post-conflict tensions and addressing injustice and human rights abuse.

I will then

analyze what kind of lessons Sri Lanka can (or cannot) draw from truth and reconciliation
processes used in similar cases. This thesis examines whether Sri Lanka poses a new
challenge to the concept of transitional justice mechanisms, i.e., truth commissions and
prosecution.

Set of Research Questions
The following are a series of questions that I will use to drive the research. By focusing
on truth commissions which have been increasingly used in post-conflict situations in the
last decade, this thesis attempts to answer these questions.


How to reduce the likelihood of the resurgence of future conflict in transitional
society? What mechanisms can be established to assist reconciliation?



What is the effectiveness of truth commissions and criminal justice prosecutions in
finding truths and achieving reconciliation?



Can one mechanism replace the other or are both necessary?

For the purpose of this thesis, I use the term “reconciliation” to be applied on the national
and political level. Reconciliation, however, does not necessarily require forgiveness on
the individual level. It means the general public gains a shared understanding of its past
and then works together to build a peaceful and stable society.

I will also argue that

reconciliation does not simply mean concealing wounds and putting aside the past
unconditionally. Only after the state and society come to understand the causes of
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conflict and acknowledge wrongdoing through the mechanism of truth commissions, can
a process of reconciliation begin.
Drawing experiences from past commissions chronologically in El Salvador, South
Africa, and Sierra Leone, I will analyze tensions between justice and truth and to what
extent truth commissions are effective in promoting reconciliation and achieving a
durable peace. Then, I will examine the recently established commission in Sri Lanka as
a case study.

I will conclude that both justice and truth are preconditions for

reconciliation in a country experiencing transition from conflict to peace.

Chapter Outline


Chapter One: Introduction



Chapter Two: Review of the literature



Chapter Three: Restorative justice vs. retributive justice



Chapter Four: Case studies on truth commissions in El Salvador, South Africa, Sierra
Leone, and Sri Lanka.



Conclusion
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Chapter Two
Review of the Literature
The Definition of Reconciliation
The ultimate purpose of truth commissions is to address the structural causes of conflict
and to prevent the repetition of human rights violations. This seems impossible unless a
divided society come to agree to work together towards this goal. Then, what is the
meaning of reconciliation? Is it possible to make it happen through a truth commission
process?
According to James Gibson’s interpretation, “tolerance,” if not full reconciliation, is
the maximal realistic outcome possible, but “not forgiving, nor acceptance, nor even the
suspension of hatred.”

3

Alternatively, Martha Minow defines reconciliation as

“minimum agreement to coexist and cooperate, or a stronger commitment to forgive and
unify.”4

In this thesis, I will focus on reconciliation on the national level and use the

former definition which excludes forgiveness as a part of reconciliation.
Reconciliation does not necessarily require forgiveness because it is an emotional
quality that can only be achieved on an individual level. Rajeev Bhargava notes that
forgiveness cannot be enforced because requiring victims to forget and forgive may
further damage a person’s sense of self-respect and dignity.

3

Forgiving may be possible

James Gibson, “The Contribution of Truth to Reconciliation: Lessons from South Africa,” Journal of
Conflict Resolution, 50, no. 3 (June 2006): see note 28, 426.
4
Martha Minow, “The Hope for Healing: What Can Truth Commissions Do?” in Robert Rotberg and
Dennis Thompson. eds., Truth v. Justice: The Morality of Truth Commissions, (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2000): 250.
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only when perpetrators acknowledge and repent wrongdoing. 5

Bhargava even claims

that TRCs must not have an ambitious goal of bringing about reconciliation because
commissions can only create “conditions” for reconciliation.6

In place of calling for

forgiveness and amnesia, TRCs can at best facilitate remembrance of wrongdoing as
collective memory that signifies an acknowledgement of injustice, thereby preventing the
recurrence of human rights violation.7
Priscilla Hayner proposes three questions in identifying whether reconciliation exists
or is in progress: 1) “How is the past dealt with in the public sphere?” 2) “What are the
relationships between former opponents?” 3) “Is there one version of the past, or many?” 8
In brief, her questions ask: Is there an open discussion about past events even with former
opponents in search for the possibility of coexistence and of mutual respect, resulting in
an agreement on shared past, if not consensus? Considering that it is not possible for the
public to hold one truth or reach a consensus especially in a democracy, reconciliation in
a post-conflict society that is experiencing transition to democracy seems an impossible
task without truth-seeking efforts on the national level.

5

Rajeev Bhargava, “Restoring Decency to Barbaric Societies,” in Robert Rotberg and Dennis Thompson.
eds., Truth v. Justice: The Morality of Truth Commissions, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000),
52.
6
Ibid., 61.
7
Ibid., 54.
8
Priscilla Hayner, Unspeakable Truths: Transitional Justice and the Challenge of Truth Commissions,
(New York: Routledge, 2011), 189.
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Under what conditions truth contributes to reconciliation?
Reconciliation requires two conditions: first, accountability for past violations and second,
the creation of a political culture that respects human dignity and the rule of law. 9
Accordingly, truth commissions and prosecution aim to fulfill these two conditions.

As

important as international pressure, civil society is also crucial in determining the success
of TRCs by applying public pressure to create effective domestic institutions. 10

Overview of Truth Commissions
The purpose of Priscilla Heyner’s writing is to understand the role of truth commissions
as one of many tools available for transitional justice in a country emerging from war to
peace or from authoritarian rule to democracy.

Criminal justice aims at bringing

perpetrators to justice by evaluating “evidence of criminal wrongdoing and violation of
international law.”11

In comparison, a truth commission is a victim-focused approach by

probing “overall patterns, causes, and consequences of political violence.”

12

Specifically, Hayner summarizes five aims of a truth commission: first, establish truth
through fact-finding; second, assist victims by hearing, respecting, and responding to the
needs of victims and survivors; third, promote justice - help counter impunity, and make
clear recommendations to advance criminal accountability; fourth, advance reforms -

9

Ronald Slye, “Amnesty, Truth, and Reconciliation: Reflection on the South African Amnesty Process,” in
Robert Rotberg and Dennis Thompson. eds., Truth v. Justice: The Morality of Truth Commissions,
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 170.
10
Hayner (2011), 205.
11
Ibid., 16.
12
Ibid., 13.
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evaluate the institutional responsibility for abuses, to outline the reforms needed to
prevent further abuses; and fifth, promote and facilitate reconciliation.13

Strengths of Truth Commissions
The striking difference between criminal justice and a truth-seeking approach is that a
successful truth commission will encourage public awareness about the needs and
experiences of victims, resulting in motivating people across society to change their
views and reconcile with each other. Heyner finds a truth commission more appropriate
in a fragile and divided society because truth-seeking would not upset peace, whereas the
criminal justice approach could further widen existing political and social cleavages
especially when perpetrators remain in power and resist change.
While prosecutions might give consolation to victims, the author throws out a
question; “how can victims forgive without knowing who to forgive and what to forgive
them for?”14

In her observation, prosecutions have little success on the national level

because perpetrators are given amnesty in many cases, thus, deterrent effects of trials in
international courts are mixed.15

Limitations of Truth Commissions:
In the meantime, Hayner acknowledges inherent limitations of a truth commission in
terms of time frame, resources, and resistance from people in power who committed

13
14
15

Ibid., 20-22.
Ibid., 23.
Ibid., 8-9.

13

human rights violations. At the same time, she cautions against overstated assumptions
that truth-seeking gives psychological catharsis of knowing the truth to all victims. The
impact of a truth commission on victims who suffered from political violence differs from
person to person. The aim of a truth commission is not to give therapy to victims, but to
“gather as much detailed information from the greatest number of victims as possible to
allow an accurate analysis of abuses over a period of time”16 in order to establish “a
broad and specific truth that will be accepted across society.” 17
With regard to reconciliation on the national level, Hayner is cautious about having
too high expectations of the efficacy of TRCs. While a truth commission does promote
the process of reconciliation, a truth-seeking process may not be a universal remedy.
Joanna Quinn and Mark Freeman18 reveal methodological and operational challenges
that commissioners and staff faced during the South African TRC process. In line with
Hayner’s research conducted in 2011, the article reminds us of misperceptions about the
TRC as being a panacea for victims and warns that commissions could have negative
effects such as traumatizing people involved or sharpening political and societal
cleavages.

It emphasizes the importance of learning from mistakes and sharing

experiences to improve the effectiveness of future commissions.

16

Ibid., 151.
Ibid., 84.
18
Joanna Quinn and Mark Freeman, “Lessons Learnt: Practical Lessons Gleaned from Inside the Truth
Commissions of Guatemala and South Africa,” Human Rights Quarterly, 25, no. 4 (Nov. 2003).
17

14

Justice and Accountability vs. Reconciliation
Hayner suggests that truth-seeking and criminal justice mechanisms are not necessarily
mutually exclusive, but rather, a truth commission could play a role in advancing
prosecutions by providing evidence collected from victims and perpetrators to the courts.
Finding the truth can also place responsibility for a crime by naming names of
perpetrators.
While Hayner’s study illustrates the evolving nature of a truth commission, there are
no standard procedures or a model for strong and effective truth commissions. Each
commission should incorporate national preferences and historical context to address
local needs. In her observation, however, weak implementations of recommendations
by commissions and declining international pressure on national governments are diluting
the efforts made by a truth commission. Truth commissions are gaining popularity
around the world, yet little attention is paid to it compared to criminal justice. Given
these facts, Hayner calls for further research on country case studies to improve the
effectiveness of a commission.
Similarly, both Carsten Stahn and Darryl Robinson describe the possibility of striking
the balance between prosecution and national reconciliation mechanisms.

Stahn

describes changes in the United Nations peace-building efforts to combine justice and
reconciliation models by treating truth commissions and prosecution as complementary.
This is exemplified by the establishment of two parallel mechanisms in Sierra Leone, one
by the government of Sierra Leone and the other by the United Nations. The Truth and
Reconciliation Commission for Sierra Leone was established by the government while
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the Special Court for Sierra Leone was created as a result of the agreement between the
government and the U.N. The latter is a mixed international and domestic court to
prosecute persons responsible for violations of human rights and international
humanitarian law committed during Sierra Leone’s civil war.
This carrot and stick approach of targeted prosecution (prosecuting only the persons
most responsible) and conditional amnesties (granting amnesties to lower-level
perpetrators on a case-by-case basis) allowed for alternative forms of justice such as
truth-telling and individualized amnesty or prosecution.

Further, Stahn maintains that

mixed national-international prosecution bodies such as the Special Court even offer
forms of justice alternatives to the ad hoc international criminal tribunals by involving
domestic citizens in the process of investigating the past and helping restore legal system
and local capacity-building.19
Darryl Robinson further examines how to uphold the goal of punishing international
crimes, while leaving room for national reconciliation programs that grant amnesties and
ultimately function as an alternative form of justice. The author explains that there are
exceptional situations where the International Criminal Court (the ICC) can defer to
non-prosecutorial reconciliation measures.

The ICC could only prosecute those most

responsible, whereas a truth commission could deal with lower-level offenders. The
ICC could also respect national programs that grant amnesties even to the most
responsible, provided that the ICC deems that accountability objectives are met through
genuine and democratic proceedings and efforts on the national level.
19

Carsten Stahn, “United Nations Peace-Building, Amnesties and Alternative Forms of Justice: A Change
in Practice?” IRRC, 84, no. 845 (Mar., 2002): 204.
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Beyond the discussion about tensions between truths versus justice, Pablo de Grieff
underscores the importance of reinstating norms in a post-conflict society.

Both

truth-telling and prosecution measures have common goals of affirming norms and
promoting recognition, civic trust, and the democratic rule of law. 20

The nature of

norms and values are weakened or broken during war, affecting not only victims, but also
non-victims who often feel that no one is safe as a result of spill-over effects. Whatever
changes may be made, people would not feel secure unless expectations are fulfilled that
others share norms and follow a certain pattern of behavior.21

The Impact of Prosecutions
In contrast to the above literature on victim-oriented restorative (truth) justice, Kathryn
Sikkink examines the impact of retributive justice (prosecutions) on the protection of
human rights.

By referring the term “justice” to legal accountability for crimes,22 she

primarily focuses on the individual criminal accountability as an emerging justice norm
since the 1990s. Her empirical studies demonstrate how the human rights movement
created the impetus for a change in domestic legal systems and helped the diffusion of the
justice norm across regions and worldwide, albeit unevenly.
Her findings suggest that human rights prosecutions as well as truth commissions can
contribute to reducing repression and improving human rights norms on the national and
international level. She contends, however, while restorative and retributive justice is a
20

Pablo de Greiff, “Transitional Justice, Security, and Development,” World Development Report 2011,
International Center for Transitional Justice, (October 29, 2010): 10-11.
21
Ibid., 11.
22
Sikkink, 12.
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complementary mechanism, a truth commission that does not employ material
punishment is unlikely to have independent effects on human rights practices. 23

Hence,

any system should include the possibility of punishment, such as the South African Truth
and Reconciliation Commission, to deter future political leaders from committing human
rights violations. Yet, she claims that prosecutions should not be held merely in the
light of ethical or rule-based concerns. Instead, possible consequences or the impact of
prosecutions on the protection of human rights need to be taken into consideration. For
this reason, prosecutions can be held only when the political conditions become ripe. 24
In brief, based on the quantitative and qualitative comparison of outcomes observed,
the literature attempts to prove that trials have lessened repression and contributed to
successful transitions in many countries.

Indeed, human rights trials contributed to the

diffusion of human rights norms and cultural change, resulting in the improvement of
human rights practices and institutional mechanisms around the world.
Yet, one limitation to her research is that “transitional countries” are limited to those
“moving from an undemocratic to a more democratic regime.”25 Unsurprisingly, her
focus is mainly on Latin America where enough time elapsed to evaluate the impact of
trials and consequently major improvements in human rights took place in the recent past.
Nevertheless, her findings do not entirely support my hypothesis because it leaves out the
question of whether the prosecution of high-level figures contributes to the reconciliation
process, or whether the same mechanisms would be effective in resolving more complex

23
24
25

Ibid., 174.
Ibid., 228-229.
Ibid., 21.
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cases involving ethnic or group identity and a legacy of colonialism in other geographic
areas.
The efficacy of prosecutorial measures in promoting reconciliation is an open
question.

Martti Koskenniemi26 reveals the difficulty of ending the culture of impunity

by means of individual criminal responsibility.

By taking an example of the Milosevic

trial at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the author
asserts that judging a person under the international criminal justice system does not
necessarily contribute to establishing the truth of events. Instead, it could end up as a
show trial, exacerbating political and ethnic divide without addressing collective guilt and
responsibility to atrocities committed during the war.

It is of interest to future scholars

to examine the impact of trials on reconciliation on a societal level in other cases where
only prosecution was conducted.

Conclusion
A TRC is a useful national reconciliation measure that respects the dignity of victims as
well as incorporating society as a whole in the process of achieving sustainable peace.
Especially, in handling the after-effect of intra-state conflict, scholars are increasingly
recognizing the importance of prioritizing national preferences over international
mechanisms.

Furthermore, with inherent weaknesses of both TRCs and criminal

prosecution in mind, it would seem that scholars are growingly in favor of taking a
holistic approach of combining truth-seeking and prosecution measures to address
26

Martti Koskenniemi, “Between Impunity and Show Trials,” Max Planck Yearbook of United Nationals
Law, Volume 6, (2002).
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violation of human rights, while overruling blanket amnesties. In the next chapter, I will
look into two types of justice: restorative and retributive justice.

20

Chapter Three
Restorative and Retributive Justice
What kind of method(s) would be appropriate in dealing with tensions between justice
and peace and facilitating reconciliation in a post-conflict society?

This chapter

examines two different types of measures to address justice and accountability: judicial
(retributive) and non-judicial (restorative). Retributive justice is achieved through trials
and prosecutions, whereas restorative justice uses non-judicial measures which include
truth commissions, reparation programs for victims, administrative sanctions such as
vetting, and traditional or local justice measures.27

For the purpose of my research, I

refer the meaning of “justice” primarily to the rule of law rather than socio-economic
justice, even though remedial measures including reparations fall into the latter category.
There are divergent views on retributive and restorative justice. Pricilla Hayner
argues that justice needs to be dealt with separately from truth because in “achieving legal
accountability through the prosecutions of individuals who committed crimes, decisions
are often political due to limited time frame and mandate of TRC.”28

Conversely, one

can counter-argue that TRCs may have little impact unless political and judicial
institutions are reformed and perpetrators are held accountable for wrongdoing in the first
place. Victims of human rights abuses often live in fear unless perpetrators are brought
to justice.

27

“World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security, and Development.” The World Bank. Washington,
D.C.: 2011. 167.
28
Priscilla Hayner, “Fifteen Truth Commissions – 1974 to 1994: A Comparative Study,” Human Rights
Quarterly, 16, no.4 (Nov.1994): 605.
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Restorative Justice - applying truth and fairness
One may ask, “What constitutes truth?” or “What is the importance of truth?”

Truth is

subjective, relative and changeable depending on basic assumptions that people hold at
the time. However, in a country emerging from political violence or armed conflict,
finding and agreeing to an official version of facts: who did what to whom, when and
why, are essential for states and citizens to come to terms with the past, learn to live with
fundamental differences, and move forward.
The benefits of TRCs are that they examine structural causes of human rights
violations and systematic patterns of accountability.

Elizabeth Kiss claims that

conducting a TRC is an important means of restoring human dignity and “doing justice”
to victims,29 if not full justice, at least a limited form of justice.
Restorative justice was promoted by the South African TRC which privileged
reconciliation over retribution by using conditional amnesty30 and mandating that the
process had to reveal an understanding of the motives of perpetrators. An amnesty
hearing process proved that the revelation of “truth” provided accountability and allowed
the possibility of reconciliation in South Africa.

Through truth seeking processes,

amnesty applicants were compelled to accept responsibility for their actions, while the
mechanism of conditional amnesty encouraged amnesty applicants to reveal the full truth
in exchange for amnesty.

29

Elizabeth Kiss, “Moral Ambition Within and Beyond Political Constraints: Reflections on Restorative
Justice,” in Robert Rotberg and Dennis Thompson. eds., Truth v. Justice: The Morality of Truth
Commissions, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 73.
30
Ibid. 79.
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Alternatively, David Mendeloff asserts that the effectiveness of TRCs is not yet clear
because no evidence shows that there is a causal logic between truth-telling and peace
building. Since concepts of justice and reconciliation and the positive and negative
definition of peace are unclear, he points to the importance of examining assumptions that
support TRCs.

For instance, the author argues that there is no obvious causality between

justice and peace because there is little likelihood of the resumption of war in countries
following transitional justice measures - whether TRCs or trials, were used.31 This
argument may serve as a warning against having over-expectations of TRCs and applying
one-sided and simplistic assumptions or beliefs in pursuing TRCs. However, this line of
reasoning is based on the negative definition of peace, i.e., mere physical security or “the
absence of large-scale, organized violence or war and the extremely low probability of the
resumption of war.”32

A superficial peace short of violent conflict is out of the scope of

my thesis. The focus would be on a sustainable peace that removes the original causes
of war, such as human rights violation and lack of economic equity.

Retributive Justice - prosecution of perpetrators
Is psychological catharsis of knowing the truth enough?

If not, how necessary is

criminal prosecution by sending perpetrators to prisons and removing them from
positions of power? What role does a trial play, if TRCs are not effective enough to do
justice? If a state is unwilling or unable to perform its responsibility to protect its own

31

David Mendeloff, “Truth-Seeking, Truth-Telling, and Postconflict Peacebuilding: Curb the
Enthusiasm?” International Studies Review, 6, no.3 (Sep., 2004): 367.
32
Ibid., 363.
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citizens from human rights violation, does the responsibility fall to the international
community?

How effective are international justice mechanisms such as the

International Criminal Court (ICC) in facilitating reconciliation?
The positive aspect of prosecution is that victims have a constitutional right to trial
and “to have their complaints heard in court.”33

Criminal prosecution is needed for

promoting either the reintegration or incarceration of perpetrators because the willingness
of the community to accept them is crucial.

Fear of living side by side with perpetrators

remains within the community unless those who carried out grave human rights violations
are found guilty or exonerated.

Incarceration will also prevent them from becoming

spoilers of reform.
Conversely, the nature of criminal trials implies the downside of retributive justice
vis-à-vis TRCs.

First, in contrast to TRCs that examine structural causes of human

rights violations and systematic patterns of accountability, criminal prosecutions probe
individual guilt, not acknowledging the causalities of collective violence. 34

Second,

because of due process and the norms of an adversarial legal system involving a vigorous
cross-examination, victims are not treated with respect, thus, failing to restore their
dignity or deliver justice to victims.35

Technically, it is not possible to bring all those

implicated in human rights violations before trials because “most countries cannot afford
costly and time-consuming trials, so relatively few will be prosecuted, the majority of

33

Priscilla Hayner, “Negotiating Peace in Sierra Leone: Confronting the Justice Challenge,” Centre for
Humanitarian Dialogue, (December 2007): 16.
34
Minow, 239.
35
Kiss, 74.
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offenders will go free.”36

Considering that “the final word of trials is punishment,” Alex

Braine asks, “Is it possible to facilitate reconciliation in a deeply divided society?” 37
Third, in trials, “the state or the victims initiate the process that demands the presence
of the accused,” while “the accused are placed in a defensive position because their goal
is to escape liability.”38

What is more, being a defendant in a criminal or civil trial, the

accused is not required to testify.

Instead, they are represented by their lawyers as the

purpose of trials is “to minimize the probability that we may be about to punish an
innocent defendant.” 39

On the contrary, the amnesty hearing process in TRCs

demonstrates that “information comes from the accused, which is then evaluated and
challenged by the victims and the state” and applicants for amnesty “initiate the
proceeding, for they are affirmatively seeking a benefit.”40
Fourth, because there are many kinds of truths, the assumptions and interpretations of
facts are based on the prosecutor’s position.

Truths are often represented by an

“international community,” i.e., Western interpretations of the political and historical
context that “the international ‘truth’ is one in the same way as domestic truth.” 41
Further, the author sees no deterrent effects of trials because “the atrocities of the 20 th
century have not emerged from criminal intent but as offshoots from a desire to do

36

Alex Boraine, “Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa: The Third Way,” in Robert Rotberg and
Dennis Thompson. eds., Truth v. Justice: The Morality of Truth Commissions, (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2000), 147.
37
Ibid.
38
Slye, 173.
39
Ibid.
40
Ibid.
41
Koskenniemi, 19.

25

good,”42 thereby warning against the danger of prosecuting few individual leaders that
could, as a consequence, absolve the population at large from taking responsibility. 43
Presumably, the author means to say that perpetrators often used whatever justification
they could use to retain sympathy, terrorize people, and ultimately to seize power.
Meanwhile, applying blame to people as a collective entity could perpetuate conflict
because it is often the case that most people do not commit human rights abuses and
remain as bystanders. This requires mounting tasks of applying fairness and rebuilding
a just society to prevent the recurrence of violence.
Relating to the assumptions and interpretations of facts, Martti Koskenniemi analyzes
the issue from the perspective of historical truth versus legal truth. Historical truth
refers to establishing the truth of the events, whereas legal truth pursues the punishment
of the individual.

The author does not argue which truth overrides the other, i.e.,

focusing on individual guilt or larger structures - functional and structural causalities, but
concludes that the latter may provide better interpretation of events by studying
“structures within which the conditions for individual criminality have been created” and
understanding intentions or actions of particular individuals. 44

At TRC hearings, for

instance, people within the system such as police and military officers can reveal vertical
structures that civilians cannot.45
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After all, what matters most in assessing the impact of prosecution is people’s
perception.

Considering that one of the aims of international criminal courts is “to

contribute to the consolidation of democracy and the triumph of the rule of law over the
instinct for revenge after prolonged periods of communal violence,” “perception of their
legitimacy by the local population is a crucial factor.” 46

Common Denominator
Despite the above mentioned differences, both of these justice measures are not mutually
exclusive but are overlapping to some extent. Based on the same core belief that public
accounting for human rights abuses is necessary for peace and stability,47 both measures
seek a “stable alternative to vengeance and of constructing a legitimate moral order.” 48
Similarly, judging from the fact that “a number of trials and prosecutions took place
simultaneously with the work of a TRC,”49 a TRC is not a substitute for criminal justice.
Rather, restorative justice appears to allow leeway in dealing with accountability and
justice in a fragile post-conflict society in preference to an absolute legal human rights
approach.
To sum up, this thesis is not meant to discount the usefulness of criminal prosecution
in general, but considers both measures as an aspect of transitional justice.

By all means,

“legal punishment of rights violators remains a powerful way of affirming the dignity of
46
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victims,”50 ridding communities of the fear of living together with perpetrators, and
promoting reintegration of lower-level offenders. In practice, the two procedures can
complement each other or be kept separately as in the case of Sierra Leone, which will be
examined in the next chapter.
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Chapter Four
Case Studies
In this chapter, I examine three different truth commissions in El Salvador, South Africa,
and Sierra Leone to compare and contrast processes and outcomes. These examples are
followed by a case study on a recently established truth commission in Sri Lanka. In
view of the differences in the presence of international sponsorship and the scale of
violence among the three cases, the thesis will explore whether there is hope for
reconciliation in Sri Lanka based on the ongoing process.
The methodology used in this chapter is underscored by Todd Landman who
describes the usefulness of comparative politics in the field of human rights in explaining
and understanding global variations. The study will establish rational (the actions of
powerful actors and groups), structural (socio-economic and institutional factors), cultural
(ideological and ethical dimensions) foundations to explain the outcomes that are
observed.

In examining the role of truth and reconciliation commissions, all country

cases are different. However, case studies are effective in the following four areas:
developing new classifications for political events and outcomes not yet observed in other
parts of the world; generating hypotheses that can be tested in other countries; confirming
proving or disproving existing theories by providing crucial tests; and explaining the
presence of deviant cases identified through cross-national comparison.51
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The Commission of Truth for El Salvador (1992~1993)
The reconciliation process in El Salvador is characterized by the behind the-scenes
assistance of the U.N. in setting up three commissions: the Ad Hoc Commission, the
Commission of the Truth, and the Joint Group for the Investigation of Politically
Motivated Illegal Armed Groups.

Following the deployment of the United Nations

Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL) in 1991 as the first UN peacekeeping
mission, the U.N. brokered peace accords were signed between the executive branch of
the El Salvadoran government and the insurgent group, Frente Farabundo Martí de
Liberación Nacional (the FMLN).

In the same year, the National Commission for the

Consolidation of Peace (COPAZ) was created as a consultation body to “oversee and
facilitate execution of the accords, parallel to the UN.” 52

It is noteworthy that COPAZ

was comprised of all political parties, including FMLN that was given a chance to
participate in the overseeing mechanism before becoming a political party. 53

Ad-hoc commission
To strike the balance between the demands of the FMLN to prosecute human rights
abusers and the government’ desire to create its own military commission, the Ad Hoc
Commission was established with the purpose of purging military.

For fear of a military

backlash, the report of the ad hoc commission was kept confidential and the
implementation was delayed.

Notwithstanding, the ad hoc commission recommended
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the dismissal or transfer of 103 officers54 and as a result, achieved unprecedented success
in forcing the military to agree to having its officers removed by civilians. 55

The truth commission
In parallel with the ad hoc commission, the truth commission was created to uncover the
truth of past abuses committed both by the military and the FMLN during twelve years of
civil war from1980 to 1991, but not to prosecute or punish wrongdoers. 56

Again, the

compromise was made between the two parties through the intermediation of the U.N.
The government accepted foreigners as commissioners,57 while the FMLN agreed not to
prosecute offenders.58
The commission employed the methodology of gathering information confidentially
to protect the victims and witnesses from a potential counterattack by the military, thus,
the accused did not have to confront the accusers. 59

Furthermore, based on the

two-source rule which requires two credible and independent sources of evidence to back
up a finding,60 only some perpetrators were recognized.

Joint Group for the Investigation of Politically Motivated Illegal Armed Groups
The third commission was created in 1993 to investigate illegal armed groups, i.e., the
death squads. The report, which was issued in the following year, pointed out the
54
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implication of “the military or police, the judicial organ or the municipal body” in the
operation, but did not name individuals due to the lack of evidence.61

Assessment
First, the most controversial outcome of the truth commission was the application of a
blanket amnesty. Despite the fact that recommendations of the truth commission were
binding,62 the government was dissatisfied with the recommendation on the removal of
named perpetrators from office. In particular, regarding the recommendation on the
reform of the Supreme Court, the government claimed that the commission was
exceeding its authority because the issue would require constitutional amendment.

Five

short days after the report was published, the national assembly swiftly granted absolute
amnesty to all who were named in the report.
As a result, the report was made public, but the public did not have a chance to debate
the amnesty, let alone the content of the report.63

Coupled with the inability of the joint

group (the third commission) to identify names linked to the death squads, Ian Johnstone
opines that lack of national debate on amnesty may have undermined the main purpose of
the commission “not to punish but to produce a ‘catharsis’ in which Salvadoran society as
a whole would come to terms with its past.”64
To a large extent, the government’s awarding of a blanket amnesty diluted efforts of
the truth commission to limit impunity.
61
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agreed not to prosecute wrongdoers. Nonetheless, the government’s decision to grant
unconditional amnesty without political or public debate caught stakeholders off-guard.
Hayner points to the fact that the peace accords left the issue of amnesty unresolved, only
agreeing that the matter would be considered six months after the completion of the truth
commission.65
Second, naming human rights violators, including those associated with the death
squads, proved to be a sensitive and difficult task under the close scrutiny of the ruling
government.

Following the vetting conducted by the ad hoc commission, naming

individuals in the truth commission report contributed to the removal of additional human
rights violators.66

Notwithstanding, those who were purged from the military did not

suffer and some even retired with honors.67
Third, the truth commission failed to report some aspects of violence, relating to
abuses committed by the death squads and the US involvement in the conflict. 68 Given
that ninety five percent of the human rights abuses were found to be committed by the
government,69 a full report on the government responsibility on wrongdoings backed by
the external force would have dampened widespread denial by the government and armed
forces.

What is more, commissioners did not recommend prosecution or punishment of

those named in the report. Neither was any suggestion made relating to conducting an
independent investigation due to the perceived inability and impartiality of the judiciary
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system.70

Yet, it can be argued that there was a positive outcome. As a product of the

recommendation by the truth commission, the third commission was subsequently
established to investigate illegal armed groups, which as a result, were disbanded.
Fourth, with regards to the implementation of recommendations by the truth
commission, little progress has been made on justice, reparations, and official
acknowledgement until the president pleaded for forgiveness in 2009, 71 16 years after the
publication of the commission report. Both negotiating parties showed ambivalence
towards the recommendation for fear of a backlash and of risking the peace process, if
implemented.72

Yet, the truth commission provided an opportunity for judicial reform in

later years.
Lastly, using foreigners in the truth commission justified the government’s claim
against the report as interference of sovereignty. The appointment of three foreign
commissioners by U.N. Secretary-General, as required under the agreement by the two
parties, seems to have backfired even though the decision was based on the principle of
international accountability of human rights. 73

As with commissioners, no Salvadorians

were employed as staff because of objectivity concerns. 74
On balance, the truth commission attempted to strike the balance between two
conflicting goals: achieving “pure” justice by punishing those responsible and by
achieving social peace by revealing the truth and not burying the past. In this way, the
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truth commission demonstrated that the goal of reinforcing the principle of accountability
can be achieved not only through judicial proceedings to prosecute offenders, but also by
the acknowledgement of the wrongdoing by those responsible. 75
In retrospect, Johnstone makes general observations from the experience in El
Salvador. Where international criminal prosecutions are not possible, the commissions
in general illustrate that there are alternatives to avoid dwelling in the past because “the
systematic denial of a history of human rights abuses is a continuing source of tension.” 76
Furthermore, “though short of criminal accountability, commissions provide a measure of
justice if (italic original) accompanied by a public acknowledgement of the wrong-doing,
removal from power of those responsible for the wrong-doings, and institutional reforms
to prevent or deter a recurrence.”77

The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (1995-2002)
The South African TRC is generally acknowledged as a success in uncovering truths
during the apartheid era and in promoting reconciliation.

Under the new multi-racial

democracy, parliamentary legislation authorized the TRC-Act in 1995 with a broad
mandate, vesting powers of granting amnesty, subpoena, and of search and seizure with
the commission.78

The TRC devised its own procedures, objectives, and methodologies,

while ensuring transparency through nation-wide broadcasting of public and private
hearings and a close collaboration with civil society.
75
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Most importantly, the TRC rejected a blanket amnesty to limit impunity and applied
conditional amnesty.

Applicants for amnesty were required to disclose the full truth of

their past in public hearings and to prove that acts of human rights violations were
politically motivated.79

And, as opposed to TRCs prior to the South African TRC,

amnesty was applied to individuals in place of collective entities such as a class of people
or a class of acts. Consequently, this individualized amnesty promoted individual moral
accountability without resorting to criminal prosecutions immediately.
Unexpectedly, amnesty hearings also brought about a positive result by requiring
“full-disclosure” by applicants. There was “no clear guidance on what would have
constituted a failure to make full disclosure.

Uncertainty created “an incentive to

disclose as much damaging material about themselves and their colleagues as they
believed the commission’s investigative team had been able to uncover.” 80

The

procedure of demanding “full” truth without a clear definition had an unintended
psychological impact on the applicants for amnesty and provided them incentives to
disclose full truth of their past.
From a pragmatic point of view, the “truth for amnesty” was a necessary political
compromise81 or the third way between a blanket amnesty and a radical notion of
justice.82

“Amnesty was a price that South Africa and many victims had to pay for a
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relatively peaceful transition and to know the truth”83 in order to encourage perpetrators
to come forward voluntarily and to disclose truth about past abuses. Otherwise, no one
would have come forward to testify for fear of prosecution.

Limited amnesty was the

leverage that encouraged others to come forward.

Impact of the TRC on Reconciliation
How can the retributive justice deficit created by amnesties be overcome?
Amnesty, if applied indiscriminately, will allow perpetrators to remain unpunished and
increase the culture of impunity.

With the use of sophisticated amnesty, however, the

South African TRC effectively reduced the retributive justice deficit. As mentioned
before, the model of “truth for amnesty” was conditional on credible evidence that crimes
had been committed on political grounds during the testimony taking in the TRC. While
conditional amnesty indemnified perpetrators from prosecution and civil liability as
inducement, perpetrators who did not confess were later brought to trial.

In fact, a

sub-committee of the commission, in charge of granting and denying amnesty, declined
most applications for amnesty submitted by those who provided testimony to the TRC. 84
In addition to conditional amnesty, the TRC maintained its effectiveness as an
institution, specifically, independence, transparency, impartiality, and legitimacy.

As

opposed to prevailing negative views on amnesty among scholars, Darryl Robinson
contends that amnesty did not undermine institutions. Instead, the retributive justice
deficit was covered by the effective TRC. The TRC was also blessed with strong
83
84
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leadership in politics, namely the TRC Chair Desmond Tutu and President Nelson
Mandela. By publicizing the process across nations, the TRC gained legitimacy among
ordinary people and educated the public incrementally through the media rather than
“comprehensively by polished summary.” 85

What specific processes lead to reconciliation?
First, accountability in a TRC mechanism contributes to reconciliation between victims
and perpetrators – commissions not only address a sense of injustice felt by victims, but
also “perpetrators are justified in claiming that they have paid their dues to society and to
the victims”86 by showing repentance and remorse. This will then facilitate perpetrators
to be incorporated into society.

At the same time, media coverage of public hearings led

the society at large, including those who colluded with the apartheid regime as well as
passive bystanders who failed to prevent violence, to rethink their views about the
contentious past and acknowledge accountability and a common memory. 87
The second condition for promoting reconciliation is that the truth-finding process
itself played a part in changing the culture in the society without legalistic processes to
provide justice to victims and perpetrators. James Gibson asserts that the South African
TRC may be an exceptional case that effectively achieved the primary goal of changing
culture or “societal transformation,” in that it prompted people to acknowledge the
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suffering of one’s opponents, accept the commission’s version of the truth, and build
consensus among the general public about the past human rights abuses under the
apartheid regime.88

The goal was achieved without employing the extensive formal

legal proceedings (trials) or prosecution method, while granting amnesty to perpetrators
to reintegrate them into a new democratic process.

The Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission (2002-2003)
Transitional justice system in Sierra Leone is characterized by the concurrent operation of
two bodies: a truth commission and a hybrid court which rejected amnesty for serious
crimes. As a result of a peace agreement (the Lomé Accord), the commission was
created in 2000.

Due to the resumption of conflict, it became operational only after

two years to look into the brutal violence from 1991 to 2002.
The conflict has an international dimension as the Liberian civil war spilled over into
the territory of Sierra Leone.

A group from the Revolutionary United Front (RUF),

headed by of the Liberian warlord, Charles Taylor, who later became the president of
Liberia from 1997 to 2003, invaded the territory of Sierra Leone in 1991.

At that time,

the Nigerian-led Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group
(ECOMOG) was obstructing the Taylor’s Liberian political faction, National Patriotic
Front of Liberia (NPFL), from taking control of the Liberian capital, Monrovia.
Infuriated by a double role that the government of Sierra Leone was playing as a mediator
as well as a collaborator by allowing ECOMOG forces to use its airport to bomb
88
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territories under the NPFL’s control, Taylor mobilized the RUF, a rebel force, to attack
Sierra Leone.89
Zack-Williams attributes various causal factors of the civil war to the
post-independence political economy in Sierra Leone. The period between 1991 and
1997 saw the emergence of a social movement to counter the incapability of the
governing ruler to distribute wealth.

Compounded by the conflict, the structural

adjustment programs by the international financial institutions made the country
increasingly dependent on loans and foreign aid and reduced employment. In particular,
the programs had a devastating effect on a vulnerable group including women and
children. 90

The deteriorating situation drove politically, socially, and economically

alienated intellectuals of Sierra Leone into exile, while others joined rebel forces to
achieve political legitimization.

The U.N. role in the peace agreement
Hayner, who engaged in the making of the commission, explores the U.N. involvement in
the peace negotiation process between the government of Sierra Leone and the
Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and its impact on justice and accountability.
contends that two factors may have weakened the national justice system.

She
First,

unconditional amnesty was awarded in the peace agreement in 1999. Second, there was
no debate among negotiating parties and civil society on alternatives to address justice
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and accountability. This resulted in the creation of a costly judicial mechanism, the
Special Court of Sierra Leone in 2002.
There still exists consensus among stakeholders and civil society that a peace
agreement was not possible without amnesty.

A blanket amnesty was awarded by the

peace agreement to all sides of the war, namely, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF),
the Former Armed Forces Ruling Council (AFRC) and the pro-government Civil Defense
Forces (CDF). To stop the violence immediately and bring peace to the country, a
negotiated solution was deemed as the only option available for the military weak
government and for rebels who feared prosecutions. In the meantime, some people
demanded forgiveness rather than punishing ex-combatants.
The U.N., in signing the agreement, exempted itself from granting amnesty by
attaching a reservation disclaimer in the amnesty provision, stating that amnesty does not
apply to international crimes such as crimes against humanity.

However, the disclaimer

was not available publicly, thus, creating confusion in the public.91

Nevertheless, this

left an opening for establishing the Special Court.
Hayner questions whether unconditional amnesty was unavoidable.

She points to

the absence of further discussions among stakeholders about alternatives to address
accountability in light of obligations of the state in relation to serious international
crimes 92 under international law.

The “all-or-nothing approach to the question of

91

Priscilla Hayner, “Negotiating Peace in Sierra Leone: Confronting the Justice Challenge,” Centre for
Humanitarian Dialogue, (December 2007): 33.
92
Ibid., 32.

41

amnesty”93 prevailed instead of linking amnesty with truth-telling as the South African
TRC demonstrated. In hindsight, she suggests that “community service schemes or
other symbolic repayment or apology requirements might have helped to reduce
displacement of former rebels…and have advanced reconciliation at the community
level.”94

Adaptation to local practices of reconciliation
Contrary to Hayner who approaches the issue from the perspective of international and
states obligations of international human rights law, Rosalind Shaw takes an entirely
different approach to reconciliation. She examines negative reactions of local people
towards the TRC and questions its universal applicability as part of post-conflict
mechanisms. Truth-telling is useful for uncovering covert and state-sponsored violence
to establish accountability, and acknowledge and compensate for the suffering of victims.
Yet, the same method does not necessarily apply to post-conflict countries like Sierra
Leone where a massive scale of violence took place among neighbors.
Shaw asserts that the Sierra Leone’s TRC unquestionably applied Western values of
verbally recounting the violence - “truth-telling” - as the only path to reconciliation,
healing, and peace, instead of building on established local practices of healing and social
coexistence by forgiving and forgetting the violence. Besides, driven by the assumption
that people need to open their wounds and heal by speaking of violence, the aim of the
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TRC was to transform people and society through a “sensitization campaign” into
recognizing their needs and telling truth.
Based on her study on the ethnography, there was little support among ordinary
people for the commission. This is due to the fact that people place more importance on
reintegrating perpetrators in post-conflict society rather than escalating social tensions by
talking publicly about their memory of violence and trauma. This attitude of forgiving
and forgetting the violence derives not only from the pragmatic needs to end violence
immediately, get on with their lives, and move forward. But also “social” forgetting and
not speaking publicly of violence was a local practice,95 in place of an impossible task of
individual forgetting as memories of violence cannot be erased.

The Impact of the TRC
In contradiction with Shaw’s assertion, some scholars claim otherwise. People were
eager to participate in public and private hearings96 and the TRC took almost 8,000
witness accounts and held numerous group hearings.97
Unprecedentedly, the TRC mandated the recognition of the needs of women and
children as both victims and perpetrators98 and paid special attention to other vulnerable
groups such as amputees and ex-combatants.99

Remarkably, the TRC was the first

commission to involve children as victims and set a precedent as a model for child
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protection and participation in a truth commission. It developed policies and procedures
to protect the rights of children.100

It additionally published a child-friendly version of

the Commission report in 2004.101

Cook and Heykoop stress immediate basic, economic,

and the protection needs of children with an emphasis on the social and economic rights
of children. However, I will not discuss this further as economic justice is beyond the
scope of my thesis.
For all the above positive impacts achieved within the limited time and funds that
solely relied on voluntary contributions, the effectiveness of the TRC was watered down
to some extent. Since ex-combatants had already been granted amnesty by the peace
agreement before the creation of the TRC, no incentive was given to perpetrators to
testify.102

In addition, the DDR (disarmament, demobilization and reintegration) process

to reintegrate ex-child soldiers in their communities was provided by the peace agreement
and was progressing under the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL)
without the TRC. The program had already involved nearly 7,000 children and was
nearly complete by the time the TRC commenced. As a result, this diluted the impact of
the TRC.103

On the community level, people’s understanding of the process was low

because of high illiteracy rates and the confusion of two separate concurrent transitional
justice institutions,104 which will be discussed later.
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The Special Court for Sierra Leone: The Taylor Trial
In the midst of the reversion to political violence, the Special Court was created by a 2002
treaty at the request of the government to prosecute those most responsible for mass
crimes.

In spite of its political, legal, and logistical challenges, the Special Court

produced significant rulings. It demonstrated that heads of states are not immune from
criminal prosecution while criminalizing the conscription of child soldiers and providing
defense to the arrestees.105
Unlike other international tribunals that were created by the U.N. Security Council,
the Special Court was created by a treaty between the government of Sierra Leone and the
U.N.

Hence, its jurisdiction was confined to crimes committed in the territory of Sierra

Leone. This meant that the TRC and the Court are dependent on “the tolerance of
foreign governments” to collect evidence available abroad.106

The Security Council

later mandated the decision by the Appeals Chamber that granted the Special Court an
international character to hold trials of heads of foreign states, namely Charles Taylor.
Subsequently, the Special Court indicted and transferred Charles Taylor, a former
president of Liberia, from Freetown to The Hague in 2006 because he posed a security
threat to the region, the Court, and witnesses. 107

Yet, the transfer of the trial remains

controversial. Even though efforts have been made to reach out to the public through
media, some Sierra Leoneans question whether or not a security threat was valid. The
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physical distance might undermine the goal of the Special Court to deepen the
understanding of victims and the public about the conflict.108

Concurrent operation of two forms of transitional justice - the TRC and the Special
Court: complementary or conflicting?
Shaw argues that the simultaneous operation of the two mechanisms was not a success as
various issues undermined its legitimacy.

The TRC and the Court were not operating

independently from each other and were suspected of partiality. 109

In addition to

overlapping jurisdiction, there was no explicit agreement on information sharing between
the two entities in the beginning. 110

On the one hand, the TRC was in a dilemma of

whether to prioritize confidentiality of information given by victims and perpetrators or to
require perpetrators to tell the truth publicly as mandated. 111

On the other hand, the

Court did not face such a problem as it is only concerned with prosecution and even
refused to allow the accused to testify before the TRC. 112

This initially created

confusion among the public and discouraged participation by civilians who feared
retaliation from ex-combatants. Meanwhile, ex-combatants were reluctant to cooperate
to testify for fear that the TRC would leak information to the tribunal113 and that their
statement may be used against them in a criminal prosecution at the Court. 114 Artz
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observes that it was unfortunate that the Court’s indictments coincided with hearings and
testimony taken by the TRC, which may have exacerbated their confusion.115
Consequently, the two bodies operated independently and agreed not to share
information. There was a clear indication by the chief prosecutor that the Special Court
does not take testimony from the TRC.116

William Schabas observes the operation of

two bodies as a success rather than failure.

As a result of a sensitization campaign, the

people in Sierra Leone came to understand the existence of the two bodies which share
objectives of pursuing accountability for human rights violations. 117

According to

statistics by a local NGO, a sensitization campaign also increased ex-combatants’ support
for the Special Court and the TRC,118 which demonstrated changes in ex-combatants’
knowledge, views, expectations, and fear about the TRC and the Court.

Sri Lanka as a Case Study
What kind of inferences can be drawn from the previous three case studies?
The final military offensive by the Sri Lankan government against the Liberation Tigers
of Tamil Eelam (the LTTE) marked the end of the protracted armed conflict in May 2009
at the cost of massive civilian casualties.119

115
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Panel of experts proposed the creation of an independent investigative body to determine
the facts and identify those responsible for human rights abuses during the final stage of
war. In response to this, the government established a Commission on Lessons Learnt
and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC) in May 2010 and its report was submitted to the
president in November 2011. While nearly three years have passed since the end of the
conflict, however, the government continues to resist international independent
investigations into the final phase of the war. Is a genuine attempt being made to rebuild
trust and create an environment of reconciliation? I will analyze legal disputes by all
sides, followed by the study of root causes in the historical context.

Then, I will

examine the commission report in comparison with a report by the U.N.

Contentious Issues: Humanitarian Law
The sudden closure of the protracted armed conflict remains highly controversial in terms
of the violation of International Humanitarian Law (IHL), universal human rights, and
accountability for heavy civilian casualties.

As a result of the annihilation of the LTTE,

only the government is left to face the allegations for human rights abuses.
Unwillingness on the part of the government to open international independent
investigations on what really transpired during the final months is hampering the
truth-seeking and reconciliation process.
In the absence of sufficient witnesses and evidence to support allegations that laws of
war and human rights were breached by both sides, disputes persist over the legality of
the use of force against “civilians” who were used as human shields by the LTTE,
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surrendered individuals, and places protected by IHL. The government is alleged to
have “deliberately” shelled civilians in No Fire Zones (NFZs) that were unilaterally
declared by the government.

Some soldiers are also charged with engaging in

“systematic” abuses and violence.

Hence, these would constitute crimes against

humanity and war crimes.120 The government, on the contrary, disputes casualty figures
estimated by the U.N. and defends its policy as a humanitarian operation.121 These
opposing arguments are not verifiable because of the difficulty in distinguishing civilians
from combatants as well as in determining the proportionality of civilian casualties
accepted in IHL.

It is disputable whether IHL, which governs state responsibility in

times of war, applies to non-state actors who are unaccountable under international
law,122 thus, absolving the state from fulfilling its obligation to protect such an entity.

The Background of the Conflict
The examination of deep rooted ethnic and political rifts provides an understanding of the
stalemate in the reconciliation process. The conflict cannot be simply analyzed as an
issue of domestic ethno-religious divide between the majority Sinhalese and the minority
Sri Lankan Tamils since this would ignore domestic realities; the majority of the Tamils
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who are currently living among numerous ethnic groups and the Muslim communities
who bore the brunt of the conflict have been displaced from their original habitats for
many years. The confluence of underlying factors have changed the dynamics of the
conflict: socio-economic inequalities and political divide within each group, elite-led
popular democracy, 123 secessionism, terrorism and counterinsurgency. 124

International

dimensions also played the role, including the diaspora, and outside interference by the
Indian military and the Norwegian-backed peace talks.
The root causes date back to British colonial rule under which a classic divide and
rule policy intensified ethnic distinctions and aggravated cleavages. 125

The minority Sri

Lankan Tamils were given favorable treatment in education and civil employment to
suppress the majority Sinhalese.

After Sri Lanka (then called Ceylon) gained the

dominion status from a crown colony of the British in 1948, 126 the Sinhalese majority
attempted to reverse the balance of power that favored the Tamils and to control politics
by establishing a predominantly Sinhalese government. The enactment of the Sinhala
Only Act in 1956, which made Sinhalese the only official language, marked the
beginning of the violent era of ethnic tensions. The government further widened ethnic
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cleavages by institutionally sanctioning discrimination against the minority group.
Opportunistic leaders capitalized on historical hostility and the affiliations of domestic
constituents to shore up support and preserve unity.
The Tamil separatism, which had developed in the 1970s to express perceived
injustice and grievances, intensified with the emergence of the Tamil Tigers (the LTTE).
Instigated by the Sinhalese Buddhist ideology and the irredentist claim of a Tamil
homeland, youths on both sides became radicalized.

Ethnic tensions between the

government and the Tamil youth culminated in the 1983 pogrom, driving a large number
of Sri Lankan Tamils to migrate to Western countries. They formed a network of
diaspora to support the Tamil cause by funding the LTTE, oftentimes by extortion, even
well after the LTTE eliminated all Tamil dissents and lost its legitimacy as the sole
representative of the Sri Lankan Tamils.

127

Asoka Bandarage attributes the

responsibility for the rise of the brutal separatist conflict to “elites from both the Sinhala
and Tamil communities – their political opportunism, hunger for power, refusal to curb
violence at the outset, and collusion with external interests at the expense of the masses of
people of all communities.”128 Meanwhile, the LTTE leader, Velupillai Prabhakaran,
originally from a low-caste Christian family, cultivated perceptions of alienation among
Tamil youths and began to send them as suicide bombers in 1987.
India, on the other hand, covertly trained Tamil militants from Sri Lanka to appease
its domestic political base in Tamil Nadu. The Indian military intervention in the north
127
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between 1987 and 1990 was met with strong resistance from the very guerrilla force that
India had trained, resulting in the withdrawal of the Indian Peacekeeping Force.
In addition to the botched Indian intervention, the de-facto Tamil state in the north
and the east of Sri Lanka and international sympathy for the Tamil’s liberation struggle
deepened the government’s suspicion of the international community. 129

The Indian

Ocean Tsunami in 2004 intensified anti-Western sentiments by the government when
some foreign aid agencies were found to be functioning as a cover to smuggle weapons to
the LTTE.130

This further polarized the public and weakened civil society.

In the last two decades, the government wavered between military solutions and
negotiated settlement until the ceasefire agreement went into force in 2002. As the
LTTE increasingly breached the truce by mounting terrorist tactics, the government
finally resorted to military solutions to bring the conflict to an end.

The U.N. Panel Report
The U.N. Panel of experts was appointed by U.N. Secretary-General and had completed
its report in March 2011 before the LLRC report became available in November the same
year. The Panel found that both the government and the LTTE had breached IHL and
human rights law during the final stage of civil war. It also examined the conduct of the
U.N. and NGOs when they ceased operations for security reasons during the conflict.
As the Panel was barred from entering Sri Lanka, it was unable to have direct contact
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with the LLRC commissioners.

Thus, its findings are based on sources from

correspondence with the government, the LLRC related information available in public
domain, media, and NGOs. 131
Despite that the LLRC report was not yet available at the time of the publication of
the Report, the Panel regards the LLRC mechanism as “deeply flawed” from its
inception

132

and severely criticizes the effectiveness and genuineness of the

government’s truth-seeking approach. The Panel condemns the LLRC mandate, arguing
that it is not explicit enough to investigate gross human rights violation and the patterns
of violence, but merely focuses on the political responsibility of past governments in
failing to protect its citizens. 133

And it questions methodological and operational

deficiencies that do not meet international standards of independence and impartiality of
the commissioners, inadequate measures to protect victims and witnesses, and lack of
transparency with little access provided to media and civil society. 134
With regard to the government’s approach to accountability, the Panel contends that
the government’s stance to choose restorative justice over retributive justice is “a false
dichotomy” and that the government inaccurately equates criminal justice with retributive
justice, whereas criminal justice has many goals beyond retribution. 135

Hence, the

commission’s decision to not hold individuals accountable is “a clear violation of Sri
Lanka’s international obligations and is not a permissible transitional justice option.” 136
131
132
133
134
135
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The Panel finds that some allegations of rights violations, that would constitute crimes
against humanity and war crimes, credible.

Allegations include the government’s

shelling of NFZs, causing most of the civilian victims137 and “systematic” abuse and
violence by soldiers.
Referring to the statement by the government that the LLRC draws on the experiences
of the South African TRC, the Panel reminds the government that the South African TRC
conducted a full investigation into both institutional and individual responsibilities. 138
To sum up, the Panel observes that the LLRC is not an adequate accountability
mechanism and demands investigation and prosecution of those responsible for alleged
abuses.

The U.N. Panel of experts further appealed to the U.N. to establish “an

independent international mechanism to monitor progress on accountability, act as a
repository of information, and conduct its own investigations,” to which U.N.
Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon declined without obtaining Sri Lanka’s consent. 139

A Commission on Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC)
In response to the proposal made by the U.N. to investigate the military operation during
the final phase of war, the government established the LLRC in May 2010, exactly a year
after the termination of war. The final report, which was submitted in November 2011,
examines the time period from 2002, when the interim ceasefire agreement became
operational, to the end of the conflict in 2009. To handle overwhelming requests from
137
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the public to participate in hearings and a large volume of documents collected, the
commission explains that the time limit for completing the final Report of the
commission as specified in the original warrant had to be extended three times. 140
The mandate notes that it conducted hearings throughout the country which were open
to the public and media unless a person requested confidentiality. This resulted in the
increase of public awareness and interest in its work. Those who made presentations
included not only the general public, but also representatives of the armed forces, political
leaders, journalists, local civil society, academics, and former LTTE cadres. Through
this process, the commission was able to provide victims an opportunity to tell their
stories while acknowledging the suffering of all victims of the conflict.

And, to provide

a remedy for grievances of the affected people, it referred some matters to the Attorney
General for further investigation and action.141
Recommendations and observations by the commission regarding contentious issues
include:
-

Primary evidence of the parties responsible for the shelling of hospitals in and out of
NFZs is unavailable.142

The loss of civilians is mainly attributed to the LTTE.

The security forces, on the other hand, tried to minimize civilian casualties, therefore,
they did not deliberately target the civilians in NFZs. 143

Alleged disappearances

after surrender or arrest may have been done by the actions of a few,144 indicating
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that there was no systematic abuse.
-

As for the possible implication of the security forces in the death or injuries of
civilians, the state is responsible to prosecute and punish the wrongdoers. 145

-

The commission recommends that “a special commissioner of investigation be
appointed to investigate alleged disappearances and provide material to the Attorney
General to initiate criminal proceedings as appropriate.”146

As the U.N. Panel alleges in its report, there are major setbacks in the commission.
Among the many flaws is the lack of description of the structural cause of violence
observed throughout the conflict.

While the commission attempted to analyze root

causes of the war dating back to the post-independence era and calls for reconciliation
and forgiveness, it simply states that “the root cause of the ethnic conflict lies in the
failure of successive Governments to address the genuine grievances of minorities.” 147
Second, other than the LTTE, it does not identify those responsible for the past events.
The LLRC acknowledges that victims and survivors have a right to know the truth148 by
stressing on state responsibility to resolve many issues including the resettlement of
internally displaced persons (IDPs) and devolution of power. 149

But it dodges the

contentious issue on the violation of IHL and human rights law during the final stage of
war. Hayner’s question comes back in: without knowing the truth of who did what to
whom, who can a person forgive and what for?
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Third, the commission lacks independence and impartiality because all eight
commissioners were Sri Lankan nationals appointed by the president.150

Fourth, even

though there were a large number of participants from local community and civil society
in and out of the country, major human rights INGOs, namely Human Rights Watch,
Amnesty International, and the International Crisis Group, turned down the commission’s
invitation to hearings. 151

This undermined the credibility and legitimacy of the

commission domestically and internationally.

Fifth, the dissemination of the report is

not sufficient. While the commission acknowledges the importance of learning of each
others’ languages,152 the report is written only in English. It needs to be translated into
both Tamil and Sinhalese languages to raise public awareness of the issue and
understandings of the truth-seeking process.

Can Sri Lanka learn from its past commissions?
Prior to the LLRC, some commissions were created under the Commissions of Inquiry
Act in 1948.

According to the U.N. Panel Report, however, the commission lacks

independence as the Act vests the president with broad powers. The result is abysmal in
terms of addressing accountability. No follow-up actions were taken to implement the
commission’s recommendations due to a lack of political will.153
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For example, “Commissions of Inquiry into the Involuntary Removal or
Disappearance of Persons” were created by presidential action and was conducted
between 1994 and 1997 to investigate abuses both by state forces and the armed
opposition.

The Commissions were divided into three geographical regions and

implemented the mandate independently and differently. 154

While the commissions had

subpoena powers and conducted public hearings, they did not conduct in-depth
investigations.

As families and parliament refused to accept amnesty for truth, the

commissions received limited answers regarding disappearances.155

Not surprisingly,

none of perpetrators came forward to acknowledge their responsibility. 156

The final

report of the commissions157 does not call for forgiveness or reconciliation, but simply
documented disappearance and recommended that reparations be made.

Although the

report refers to the complicity of the political leadership in abductions and disappearances
as well as the liability of armed groups, there is no mention of individual responsibility.
Instead, names of individuals were submitted to the president in confidential lists.
Judging from the fact that 150 perpetrators were charged in the High Court, 158
however, it would seem that there were genuine efforts made by the president and
commissioners to address impunity in coordination with the judicial system.
Unfortunately, the war disrupted the commissions’ work and limited their access to parts
of the country.

In the end, those charged by the Court were never prosecuted because
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then President Kumaratunga desisted from alienating the military whose support was
crucial in fighting the ongoing war. 159

The failure of the president in implementing the

recommendation by the commissions may have enhanced the culture of impunity.

Regional and International Response to the LLRC
Internationally, Sri Lanka is growingly facing external pressure.

The U.N. Human

Rights Council (UNHRC) resolution in 2009160 highlighted the polarization of the human
rights issue. The resolution praised Sri Lanka for its success in eradicating terrorism,
whereas major Western countries and INGOs widely condemned the government’s
“excessive” use of force and its reluctance to admit wrongdoing or address impunity
through the LLRC.161

In contrast to the 2009 resolution, however, the UNHRC recently

passed a U.S.-initiated resolution, urging Sri Lanka to implement recommendations by
the commission.162

The UNHRC states that the LLRC does “not adequately address

serious allegations of violations of international law,” thereby requesting “the
Government to present a comprehensive action plan detailing the steps implementing the
recommendations made in the Commission’s report and to address alleged violations of
international law.” 163

It also encourages the Office of the United Nations High
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Commissioner for Human Rights and other mandate holders to provide advice and
technical assistance with the government on implementing the above steps.
In defiance of the resolution, Sri Lanka expressed that the resolution was a detriment
to the implementation process in the country because a local mechanism must fulfill their
mandate according to international law and that time and space is necessary to investigate
further.

The government even denounced the resolution, stating that it exposes

politicization and employs a double standard on human rights applied elsewhere and a
parochial attitude of the Western powers.164
Regionally, neighboring countries are divided on the issue of Sri Lanka. Notably,
India voted for the final resolution at the UNHRC, whereas China, Indonesia, Thailand,
Bangladesh, the Philippines, and Maldives voted against and Malaysia abstained. Since
the failure of the military intervention and assassination of former Indian Prime Minister
Rajiv Gandhi by the LTTE in 1991, India had maintained a low profile in relation to Sri
Lanka’s conflict. Now faced with a demand from anti-Sri Lankan elements in Tamil
Nadu to mount pressure on the government of Sri Lanka, 165 India seems to be taking an
assertive position against delayed national reconciliation.

By cultivating regional rivalry

between India versus China and Pakistan, the government conveniently relies on China’s
political support within the U.N. Security Council as well as its economic assistance and
investments.

These allow the government to deny allegations of abuses and pursue
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development-oriented reconciliation in place of granting political concessions to the
Tamils.166
To date, Tamil resentment against continued repression by the government remains
unabated even after the demise of the LTTE.

The Economist 167 reports on the

concentration of political power in president’s family.

Given that three brothers are

commanding major political institutions, institutional changes are stifled by the
judiciary’s lack of independence, transparency, and impartiality.

Post-conflict policies

and an atmosphere, ranging from the heavy military presence in the former conflict zones
to political and social divisions, and resentment among people, suggest persisting fragile
conditions. This was further illustrated by the fact that the Tamil National Alliance won
the majority of seats on local councils in the north in the 2011 elections, signifying that
the Tamils are increasingly questioning the government’s reconstruction and
reconciliation efforts centered on economic development, implemented mainly through
large-scale infrastructure projects.168
Thus far, the domestic political and social situation in Sri Lanka is a far cry from
initiating changes in “political culture (the beliefs, values, attitudes and behaviors that
predominate in a political system),” 169 reaching acceptable versions of truth across
society, and coming to terms with its past on the national and individual levels. On top
of the absence of strong opposition parties to put pressure for change, the majority of
people seem numbed by emergency laws enacted by the governments throughout the
166
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conflict, during which human rights have been trumped in preference to national security.
This weakened the rule of law and the rights of individuals. 170
There is little to suggest in Gibson’s findings on the South African TRC, that the
LLRC’s approach of understanding the past is likely to contribute to reconciliation in Sri
Lanka. The success of the South African TRC was dependent on a strong commitment
to the rule of law and legal universalism, in which blame was shared by all sides
irrespective of ideology or party. Moreover, the fact that South Africa was not involved
in an outright civil war and that there were many bystanders facilitated reconciliation
processes. Primarily, the difference was that the whole South African political structure
had changed, while this has not happened in Sri Lanka.
In this regard, the nature of conflict in Sri Lanka appears to be on the opposite end of
the spectrum. Gibson’s view is that “when security concerns or wars against terrorism
….. are allowed to trump equal and universal applications of human rights principles,
then whatever truth might be produced is unlikely to have legitimacy with all parties.” 171
In addition, in light of the extent of injuries inflicted during the struggle, “truth and
reconciliation processes may not be very effective in polities in which historical
grievances are commonplace.”172

In other words, reconciliation seems harder to achieve

in a situation where the just war thesis tends to be used as an excuse to use force against
terrorism and IHL is widely ignored, trumping condemnation of gross human rights
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abuses.173

In this scenario, with the end of the outright military victory of one side over

the other in Sri Lanka, the “victors” are unlikely to put blame on themselves or share
blame for the suffering of victims. This will discourage the community at large from
empathizing with the “losers,” thus, deflecting a reconciliation process.
It remains to be seen whether the government is intent on implementing
recommendations by the LLRC including devolution of power that gave rise to the
conflict, let alone following the recent resolution adopted at the UNHRC.

After all, by

implementing recommendations of the commission that was set up by the president
himself, the country can show to the outside world that it is pursuing a genuine
home-grown solution to protect the human rights of its people.
In summary, given the present circumstances, reconciliation seems a long way from
recovering human rights norms that were severely weakened through the protracted
conflict. Current exclusionary policies of the government may be insulating the public
from discovering the truth.

As reported by an INGO,174 the post-conflict society is

experiencing the same pattern of violence.

With the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA)

still in effect since 1979, any dissent or popular protest risks being considered terrorism
by the government.

Media is censored and abductions and disappearances of journalists

and activists continue. Deprived of freedom of speech that underpins democracy, fear
and anxiety appear to be driving the general public to impose self-censorship. If that is
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the case, how can we expect victims to know the truth? Meanwhile, unresolved root
causes may reactivate a sense of injustice among the Tamil survivors and a feeling of
revenge among the Tamil diaspora who are still living in the memory of the 1983 pogrom.
Taking into account that justice signifies the establishment of a Tamil homeland for the
diaspora, this might lead to the resurgence of violent ethnic tensions.
Furthermore, the case challenges the efficacy of a theory of constructivism in
changing state behavior.

Bandarage points to the “Boomerang Pattern” 175 which

illustrates how local interest groups “mobilize international support and then turn that
pressure back on their own local governments in order to further their causes. In effect,
international organizations then become allies of one side in a conflict, not neutral
participants.”176

In case of Sri Lanka, she argues that global civil society served to

propagate the Tamil cause by the West, while making the government, with little
international leverage, feel unfairly targeted, thereby denouncing outside interference.
As this argument exemplifies, mistrust of the U.N., intergovernmental organizations, and
civil society, especially foreign funded NGOs, seems deep-seated. Is there a possibility
of changing these negative perceptions held by leaders of the country and initiate changes
in the future? Whether or not Sri Lanka can reverse this trend depends heavily on
political leaders who recognize that “Sri Lanka should do what is right because it is right,
not because of pressure from outside,” instead of paradoxically following the so-called
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hypocrisy of Western states that accept “the inevitability of collateral damage in the war
against ‘terrorist groups.’”177

Summary of the Four Cases
Evidence from case studies shows that there is no template of TRCs that are applicable to
all situations, because the dynamics of participating actors as well as socio-economic and
cultural factors influence the process and outcome. The El Salvador TRC was met with
denial by actors who eventually ignored recommendations by the commission by granting
a blanket amnesty. The South African case may be an exceptional case where, under the
new democratic government led by inspiring political leaders, a nationally conceived
truth for amnesty policy and procedures served to a greater extent in promoting
reconciliation. The fact that “the resolution of conflict was through negotiation, not
through victory on the field of battle, nor through the collapse of a former regime”
contributed to the successes of the South African TRC because “negotiation politics
involved a search for consensus and this included compromise.”178
Accordingly, why did the Sierra Leone TRC, which was equally created through
peace negotiations, fail to follow the South African processes of conditional and
individualized amnesty, at the same time as punishing politically motivated crimes?
This occurred because the government of Sierra Leone granted amnesty in the peace
agreement, and only allowed an international court to conduct prosecution. Even though
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the issue of power-sharing between the government of Sierra Leone and the military
strong-rebels allowed for compromise of the peace agreement in the end, the government
needed to live up to the accord and meet immediate political needs of negotiating peace.
In the meantime, the U.N. was aware of the terms of the peace accords and intended to
create the court.
Above all, the scale of brutality and the number of children involved in Sierra Leone’s
war cannot be equated with the state-sanctioned apartheid in South Africa. In Sierra
Leone where a huge number of children were used as a tool of violence, the issue of
reintegration into society and reconciliation becomes all the more important in preventing
future violence. This may require a less stringent approach in order to absorb displaced
children back to community and the Court exempted children from prosecution.
The context of the Sri Lankan case appears distinct from any precedents.

First, in El

Salvador and South Africa, civil society played an important role in pressuring
governments into establishing TRCs, whereas Sierra Leone sought international
involvement. Conversely, Sri Lanka is deeply suspicious of civil society and outside
interference, while the public has always been highly politicized under the messy
democracy.

Second, the conflict in El Salvador and Sierra Leone ended in stalemate,

thereby stakeholders had to compromise on power sharing to achieve peace process. In
comparison, after the failure of outside interference and rounds of peace negotiations, the
conflict in Sri Lanka ended with outright military victory, requiring the government little
concession while politically being shielded by China. Third, the nature of the conflict is
dissimilar in all cases.

In particular, the society in Sri Lanka seems more divided
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politically and ideologically compared to a class war in El Salvador, the state sanctioned
racial segregation in South Africa, and a rebel movement without a clear political agenda
in Sierra Leone. Taken together, a truth commission in Sri Lanka poses a new challenge
to transitional justice mechanisms.
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Conclusion
A truth commission is an effective measure in a post-conflict society to promote
reconciliation by acknowledging the dignity of victims, while simultaneously
encouraging the society as a whole to know the truth, to recognize structural causes of
violence, and to bring those who committed human rights abuses to account.
Nonetheless, TRCs will remain ineffective without a thriving civil society and/or an
international framework to monitor transitions and to pressure states to respect the
principles of human rights of their citizens. The cost of inaction by states and the
international community could result in the resurgence of violence and instability.
This thesis recognizes that the capability to assess the impact of TRCs is limited since
evidence is incomplete or inaccessible and oftentimes lost. This is compounded by
weak implementation of recommendations by TRCs without follow-up mechanisms, such
as an independent oversight body, to monitor and oversee the progress on transforming
recommendations to actions by states.

Furthermore, perceptions of individuals are

relevant in order to find out the extent to which justice and reconciliation are achieved.
In spite of the above limitations, however, this thesis has advanced the argument that the
degree of national reconciliation is measured by the implementation of recommendations
by TRCs, thereby creating a rule based and transparent society where people learn to live
with others on the basis of fundamental differences in historical interpretations with
mutual respect, even if it may fall short of full reconciliation.
For all these constraints faced by states, including weak implementation and limited
time and resources, the case studies illustrate important findings on TRCs.
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Most

significant is the fact that TRCs evolved over time to respond to local context and
preferences and facilitate reconciliation in keeping with international standards.
Naturally, variations exist in terms of the structure, size, capacity, mandate (a given time
period and types of violations to examine), powers, and the scope of recommendations.
It is, therefore, not pragmatic to transpose one model of TRC to another, but TRCs can
learn from one another to enhance the effectiveness as one of transitional justice
mechanisms.
As demonstrated by case studies in El Salvador and Sierra Leone, the international
community played a crucial role in increasing the impact of TRCs as well as launching
complementary mechanisms.

In particular, international or hybrid systems tend to

enhance impartiality of TRCs and outreach to the public in collaboration with civil
society. Yet, foreign participation may not necessarily guarantee positive effects on
reconciliation. Johnstone notes that joint groups comprising both locals and foreigners
may be ideal, but the individuals chosen carry some weight after all. 179

Likewise,

Hayner recommends prioritizing national preferences by using domestic qualified persons,
if available, because foreigners may find it too complex to handle some situations.180
The thesis also examined the relationship between TRCs and other justice
mechanisms such as criminal prosecution. A dominant theme that runs throughout the
selected case studies is that prosecution and amnesty can be applied on a case by case
basis. Conditional amnesty is at times necessary to induce offenders to come forward
and testify at hearings. In view of the impracticality of prosecuting all responsible,
179
180

Johnstone, 44.
Hayner (2011), 215.
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exemplary prosecution of the few most flagrant offenders or responsible parties may have
a deterrent effect. However, this could pose a risk of being perceived as nothing more
than a show, resulting in more social division. In short, it is important to limit the
politics of compromise to address justice and accountability, while adjusting processes to
local needs and realities on ground.

Policy recommendation
At present, it is too soon to tell whether Sri Lanka will fall back into violence and
instability. Nevertheless, following my hypothesis, there has been no prosecution to
address past abuses, nor institutional reforms to prevent human rights violation in the
future. Therefore, an environment of impunity still seems to exist.
Given that the existing mechanism in Sri Lanka may be insufficient for achieving
reconciliation, are there other mechanisms that the country could use? Reflecting upon
the El Salvador case, the post-conflict situation is similar in terms of strong resistance by
ruling governments to finding truths and accounting for human rights abuses. Although
it may be premature to conclude that the LLRC is a failure, the Sri Lankan government
could establish additional commissions, similar to those in El Salvador, to vet and
investigate the conduct of the security forces during the final stage of war and those who
are allegedly involved in abductions and disappearances during and after the conflict.
Meanwhile, in line with the DDR program used in Sierra Leone, the downsizing of
security forces in former conflict zones and the ultimate nationwide demilitarization
would generate additional resources for social programs, such as education and skills
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training, in order to rehabilitate and reintegrate war-affected populations, thus, making
them productive parts of society. This will, in turn, diminish perceived and real threats
posed by the Tamils militancy and the diaspora of reigniting conflict.
Despite the usefulness of a TRC, its effectiveness is subject to objections and
reservations by states to respect human rights norms and a double standard relating to
human rights among the international community. Whether the Sri Lankan government
will defer to international pressure and/or initiate political reconciliation early enough to
prevent the recurrence of conflict still remains open to question. To this end, this study
calls for more research to respond to a new challenge that TRCs are facing in dealing with
post-conflict countries with divergent political, economic, and social aspects.
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